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The new round of services negotiations has begun, not with passionate
intensity, but with a rather mechanical sense of “since we said we would,
therefore we must.” Although the lack of attention from those opposed to
freer trade is cause for relief, the lack of conviction in supporters of new ne-
gotiations merits concern. The reason for both, however, is the limited im-
pact so far of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Creat-
ing a framework of rules in this diﬃcult area was certainly an achievement,
but the GATS has so far failed to deliver meaningful liberalization, and it
has invariably been a step behind technological and regulatory develop-
ments in services. The agreement is generally perceived, not as a scourge of
protection, but as a rather stodgy reaper of liberalization accomplished
elsewhere.
In highlighting the limitations of the GATS, which is the main purpose of
this paper, it is easy to understate what it has accomplished. In recognition
of the fact that many services require proximity between consumers and
suppliers, the agreement went beyond the traditional notion of trade (in-
cluding only cross-border delivery) to encompass supply through the move-
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tributed to the World Bank.ment of both capital and labor.1The agreement also created a framework to
deal with forms of protection more complex and less visible than tariﬀs.
These include, ﬁrst, a variety of quantitative restrictions, ranging from
cargo sharing in transport services and limits on the number of (foreign)
suppliers in telecommunications and banking to restrictions on the move-
ment of service-providing personnel that aﬀect trade in all services. Then
there are numerous forms of discrimination against foreign providers,
through taxes and subsidies as well as by allowing less favorable access to
essential facilities such as ports, airports, or telecommunications networks.
Finally, there is a subtle class of measures that are neither quotas nor ex-
plicitly discriminatory but nevertheless have a profound eﬀect on services
trade, that is, domestic regulations such as qualiﬁcation and licensing re-
quirements.
Gandhi said that it was pointless to dream of systems so perfect that hu-
man beings no longer need to be good. It is perhaps equally utopian to wish
for international trade rules that can deliver liberalization without the will-
ingness of governments. No doubt liberalization of services is primarily a
challenge for domestic policy. Still, multilateral negotiations and agree-
ments can help in four ways, by helping to achieve deeper liberalization
through reciprocity-based market access negotiations; eﬃcient protection
and regulation through rules that favor the choice of superior instruments;
credibility of policy through legally binding commitments; and a guarantee
against discrimination through the most-favored nation (MFN) principle.
How much has the GATS already delivered in these respects?
• The GATS has created an adequate framework to deal with explicit
protection, but neither the negotiating momentum to reduce such pro-
tection nor the rules to ensure that it takes a desirable form.
• In dealing with the trade-impeding impact of domestic regulations, an
admittedly diﬃcult area, the agreement has achieved even less: the
Uruguay Round provisions were weak, and only limited progress has
been made in the last ﬁve years.
• More positively, many countries have taken advantage of the GATS to
create a more secure trading environment by legally binding current
levels of openness, and some have even precommitted to greater levels
of future openness. However, the coverage of commitments for devel-
oping countries is limited, and in some cases commitments serve to
protect the privileged position of incumbents rather than enhancing
the contestability of markets.
• As beﬁts a multilateral agreement, the GATS in principle prohibits a
country from discriminating between its trading partners. The explicit
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1. Developed country proponents of the GATS initially envisaged an inclusion only of cap-
ital movements, but developing country negotiators successfully pressed for the inclusion of
labor movements also.departures from this obligation, such as the exceptions for regional in-
tegration agreements and the exemptions listed by members, are well
known. However, the diﬃculties in preventing implicit discrimination
through domestic regulations and through the allocation of quotas
have not been adequately appreciated.
• Finally, the GATS has so far done little to address the problem of
private anticompetitive practices that fall outside the jurisdiction of
national competition law, for example, in sectors like maritime and air
transport. It has thus failed to reassure small countries that the gains
from liberalization will not be appropriated by international cartels.
The rest of this paper develops the arguments presented above and provides
suggestions on possible improvements not only in the rules of the agree-
ment but also in the speciﬁc commitments made by countries and the ne-
gotiating methodology.2 Where relevant, the paper draws upon the experi-
ence of the East Asian countries with the GATS. A basic tenet of the paper
is that it is possible to make improvements in the GATS, and to make it a
more eﬀective instrument of liberalization, without fundamental structural
changes, which are, in any case, of doubtful political feasibility.
2.2 Eﬃcient Protection
The domestic political economic forces that lead to protection may also
dictate that it is obtained through ineﬃcient instruments. In goods trade,
negotiations helped reduce protection, but ensuring that the eﬃcient in-
struments of protection were chosen was the role of rules. Thus, General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) rules broadly reﬂect the ranking
of instruments suggested by economic theory: quotas are prohibited, tariﬀs
are allowed but progressively negotiated down and bound, and production
subsidies are permitted but subject to countervailing action under certain
circumstances. The GATS rules on market access do not create a similar
hierarchy. There are two basic rules: the market access provision (Article
XVI) simply lists a set of measures, mostly diﬀerent types of quotas, that
cannot be maintained in scheduled sectors unless prespeciﬁed;3 and the na-
tional treatment provision (Article XVII) prohibits any form of discrimina-
tion (including through subsidies) against foreign services and foreign ser-
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2. The paper draws upon other research by the author, in particular Mattoo (2000a).
3. Article XVI stipulates that measures restrictive of market access that a WTO member
cannot maintain or adopt, unless speciﬁed in its schedule, include limitations on (a) the num-
ber of service suppliers; (b) the total value of services transactions or assets; (c) the total num-
ber of services operations or the total quantity of service output; (d) the total number of nat-
ural persons that may be employed in a particular sector; (e) speciﬁc types of legal entity
through which a service can be supplied; and (f) foreign equity participation (e.g., maximum
equity participation). With the exception of (e), the measures covered by Article XVI all take
the form of quantitative restrictions.vice suppliers, again, unless prespeciﬁed.4Thus, in the services context, both
the leveland the form of protection are the outcome of negotiations between
World Trade Organization (WTO) members.
2.2.1 Ranking Alternative Instruments
The question is: does economic theory in its current state suggest a hier-
archy of instruments aﬀecting services trade, and is it possible to create
rules that favor a choice of superior instruments? The superiority of subsi-
dies over trade restrictions is as valid for services as it is for goods,5 and, in
principle, tariﬀs are to be preferred to quotas for much the same reason as
in the case of goods. However, there are at least three reasons that diﬀer-
ences may arise. First, in some instances tariﬀs may not be easy to impose,
and so the substitution of a more desirable policy instrument for a less de-
sirable one may not be feasible. Second, some of the instruments that have
a tariﬀ-like eﬀect in terms of inﬂicting costs on foreign providers (such as
overly burdensome standards) are not, however, tariﬀ-like in generating
revenue. Finally, there are the numerous restrictions imposed on foreign di-
rect investment and the movement of personnel that directly aﬀect the mar-
ket structure.
Consider each issue in turn. First, the diﬃculty of switching to ﬁscal in-
struments of protection has probably been exaggerated. As far as cross-
border trade is concerned, the imposition of duties is probably most diﬃ-
cult—perhaps impossible, given the current state of technology—when a
service is delivered electronically. In this case, however, other barriers to
trade are also likely to be infeasible. Where quotas are feasible and main-
tained, as on cross-border trade in transport services, it is easy to conceive
of tariﬀ-type instruments: for example, a tax per passenger or unit of cargo
carried by a foreign company. Moreover, the auction of a quota is analo-
gous in economic eﬀect to the imposition of a tariﬀ. In the case of com-
mercial presence, a number of fiscal instruments are possible, including
entry taxes (or auctions of entry licenses), output taxes, and profit taxes.
Ironically, the legal systems of many countries allow discrimination against
foreigners through outright bans and entry quotas but make it diﬃcult to
impose discriminatory taxes.
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4. Article XVII:1 states the basic national treatment obligation: “In the sectors inscribed in
its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualiﬁcations set out therein, each Member
shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures
aﬀecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.” Unlike Article XVI, Article XVII provides no exhaustive list of
measures inconsistent with national treatment. Nevertheless, Article XVII:2 makes it clear
that limitations on national treatment cover cases of both de jure and de facto discrimination.
5. Both instruments encourage national production, the former by reducing the private costs
of national producers and the latter by imposing a cost on foreign service providers. The latter
is an inferior instrument because it leads to a deterioration in the price-quality mix that for-
eigners are able to provide local consumers. See also Hindley and Smith (1984), Hindley (1988),
and UNCTAD and World Bank (1994) for a discussion of the economics of services trade.Consider now the consequences of restrictive measures that increase
foreign costs without generating revenue. In this case, part of the loss in
consumer surplus is not oﬀset by an increase in tariﬀ revenue, so the loss in
national and global welfare is much greater. Similarly, when quotas are
imposed, their consequences for (national) welfare could be alleviated if the
rents generated accrued domestically to importers or the government rather
than to foreign exporters. However, the diﬃculties of intermediation in ser-
vices suggest that quota-rents are more likely to be appropriated by ex-
porters—or, more likely, quotas are likely to lead to socially wasteful ad-
ministration costs and rent-seeking. Hence, one general conclusion is that
if complete liberalization is not feasible, a shift from both quotas and non–
revenue-generating measures to ﬁscal measures would lead to an increase
in both national and global welfare.
A prohibition of quotas is unlikely to be politically feasible today. An in-
termediate step would be to build into GATS rules a legal presumption in
favor of ﬁscal measures (see Deardoﬀ 1994, 2000; Snape 1994; Hoekman
1996). The Uruguay Round Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments
Provisions of the GATT 1994 provides a useful model. This understanding
requires members to give preference to price-based measures and to use
quotas only if price-based measures are inadequate, and the choice must be
justiﬁed. In the GATS context, we would wish to see a shift from both quo-
tas and wasteful discriminatory regulations to ﬁscal measures. Inducing a
shift away from the former would require making the market access provi-
sion more stringent. Inducing a shift from latter has not been anticipated in
the structure of the agreement and may be worth considering. In any case,
greater ﬂexibility in the national treatment provision (which prohibits all
forms of discrimination) is not necessary, for, even if a country had com-
mitted to providing national treatment, then it is allowed to modify its com-
mitments (under Article XXI) and switch instruments of protection—as
long as the extent of protection does not increase.
2.2.2 Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment
Restrictions on foreign investment assume particular signiﬁcance in the
case of services for which cross-border delivery is not possible, so that the
price and quality of the service depend completely on the domestic market
structure. Many developing countries, including some of those in East Asia,
have been reluctant to allow unimpeded entry; instead, market access has
been conceded either by allowing limited foreign entry or by increased for-
eign ownership of existing ﬁrms. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand
are among the countries that impose equity restrictions and restrictions on
entry in key sectors like telecommunications and ﬁnancial services, and
many other East Asian countries have imposed one or the other type of re-
striction (see tables 2.1–2.3).
A central conclusion of the literature on privatization is that larger wel-
Shaping Future Rules for Trade in Services 51fare gains arise from an increase in competition than from simply a change
in ownership from public to private hands. Does the conclusion change
when the change of ownership is from national to foreign hands? Foreign
investment clearly brings beneﬁts even in situations in which it does not lead
to enhanced competition (e.g., there are entry restrictions). Foreign equity
may relax a capital constraint, can help ensure that weak domestic ﬁrms are
bolstered (e.g., via recapitalizing ﬁnancial institutions), and can serve as a
vehicle for transferring technology and know-how, including improved
management. However, if foreign direct investment (FDI) comes simply be-
cause the returns to investment are artiﬁcially raised by restrictions on com-
petition, the net returns to the host country may be negative (returns to the
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Table 2.1 East Asia Foreign Equity Participation, Degree of Competition, and Nature of
Precommitment in Fixed Telecom Networks
Degree of Competition
Country Limitations on FDI in Fixed Networks Precommitment
Hong Kong None Oligopoly of 5 in domes- Will consider issuing 
tic, monopoly in interna- more than the existing 
tional four licences for local 
ﬁxed network services in 
June 1998.
Indonesia GATS: 35% Regional monopolies  Policy review upon the 
with scope for joint oper- expiry of the exclusive 
ating schemes rights: exclusivity ex-
pires in 2011 for local 
service, in 2006 for long 
distance services, and in 
2005 for international 
service.
Japan 20% in NTT and KDD Full competition Will increase foreign 
KoreaV ariable:  Full competition, phased  equity limits: 
Facilities-based: 33%;   in over several years Facilities-based: 49% in 
KoreaTelecom: 20%;  2001; Korea Telecom: 
Resale-based: 0% 33% in 2001; Resale-
based: 49% in 1999, 
100% in 2001
Malaysia GATS: 30% Increasing competition; 
discretionary licensing
The Philippines GATS: 40% Full competition; discre-
tionary licensing
Singapore GATS: 73.99% (direct:  Monopoly Oligopoly of 3 or more 
49%, indirect: 24.99%) after April 2000
Thailand Limited, in BTO  Monopoly, with some  Will introduce revised 
arrangements BTO arrangements commitments in 2006 
when new law comes 
into force.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.investor may exceed the true social productivity of the investment). To some
extent the rent appropriation may be prevented by proﬁt taxation or by
holding competitive auctions of licenses or equity, but the beneﬁts of com-
petition would still not be obtained.6
Entry restrictions are becoming harder to justify in the face of growing
evidence of the beneﬁts of competition.7 Why then do we observe such
widespread restrictions on entry? While it is possible to construct special
models of market and/or regulatory failure where entry barriers enhance
welfare (Laﬀont 1998), there are usually more prosaic reasons for the bar-
riers. First, restrictions generally aim to protect the incumbent suppliers
from immediate competition for infant industry–type reasons, to facilitate
“orderly exit,” or simply due to political economy pressures. The result is
protection not only of national ﬁrms but also of foreign incumbents—as in
the case of foreign telecom monopolies in Hong Kong, foreign insurance
companies in Malaysia, and, most strikingly, the bilateral agreements in air
transport. Other instruments, such as discriminatory subsidies or taxes,
could be better targeted. Monopolistic or oligopolistic rents are also some-
times seen as a means to help ﬁrms to fulﬁll universal service obligations
through cross-subsidization. However, governments are increasingly devis-
ing means of achieving these objectives without sacriﬁcing the beneﬁts of
competition: for example, by imposing universal services obligations on
new entrants or asking for competitive bids for subsidies to serve unprof-
itable areas. In some cases, a form of “investment pessimism” exists, lead-
ing to the belief that promises of oligopoly rents are necessary to attract new
investment. However, it is not clear why the market structure needs to be de-
termined by policy, unless there are some initial investments the beneﬁts of
which may be appropriated by rivals. Finally, governments may seek to raise
revenue (or rents for politicians and bureaucrats) by auctioning monopoly
or oligopoly rights. This amounts to indirect appropriation of consumers’
surplus. However, the static and dynamic ineﬃciencies consequent upon
lack of competition would still exist.
Ideally, multilateral rules should make it diﬃcult for governments to re-
sort to trade restrictions to pursue objectives that are better achieved
through other means. In each of the cases mentioned above, entry restric-
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6. It is also diﬃcult to provide an economic rationale for foreign equity restrictions. The in-
centive to transfer technology or otherwise to improve performance is bound to be less for for-
eign investors if they will only receive a fraction of the gain. It would, therefore, be optimal to
allow full foreign ownership to prevent dilution of incentives and extract potential rents
through the initial sale price. However, political concerns about foreign control probably ac-
count for the broad ownership restrictions in countries like Malaysia and the Philippines and
in the incumbent ﬁrm in the telecom sector in Japan.
7. In Latin America, for example, countries that granted monopoly privileges to telecom op-
erators of six to ten years to the privatized state enterprises saw connections grow at 1.5 times
the rate achieved under state monopolies but only half the rate in Chile, where the government
retained the right to issue competing licenses at any time.tions are at best a second- or third-best instrument to achieve the objective
in question, but they are chosen because of constraints such as the inability
to raise revenue without economic or political cost. It will probably be diﬃ-
cult and not necessarily desirable to outlaw completely barriers to entry.
However, it may be possible to create a legal presumption against such bar-
riers by requiring that a country that imposes them demonstrate that they
are necessary—in the sense that more appropriate instruments are not fea-
sible. This idea is developed below.
2.3 Credibility through GATS Commitments
It is well known that the freedom to change one’s mind can be a nuisance.
The GATS oﬀers a valuable mechanism to make credible commitments to
policy. Failure to honor these commitments would create an obligation to
compensate those who are deprived of beneﬁts, making the commitment
more credible than a mere announcement of liberalizing intent in the na-
tional context. Governments can bind current policy or commit themselves
to implement liberalization at a future date.
Unfortunately, with some exceptions, not much was made of this oppor-
tunity. In general, countries made limited commitments, excluding many
sectors and many modes (see Hoekman 1996; Adlung 2000). The larger
East Asian economies did bind a certain level of access in segments of ma-
jor services sectors like business, communication, ﬁnance, transport, and
tourism, but few countries made commitments in sectors like distribution,
education, and environmental and health services. Several countries in the
region bound at less than the status quo, at least with respect to some as-
pects of their regimes. The Philippines, for example, did so with respect to
foreign equity participation in commercial banks, binding at 51 percent
when domestic law allows 60 percent. Korea also stopped short of reﬂect-
ing in its GATS oﬀer all the present and future liberalization commitments
made at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).8
2.3.1 Precommitment
One reason governments may be reluctant to liberalize immediately is a
perceived need to protect the incumbent suppliers from competition—ei-
ther because of infant industry–type arguments or to facilitate “orderly
exit.” The failure of infant industry policies in the past, and the innumerable
examples of perpetual infancy, is attributable in part to the inability of a
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8. Furthermore, under the terms of the International Monetary Fund agreement, the de
facto regime with respect to foreign capital is already more liberal than the GATS oﬀer. For
instance, president Kim Dae-Jung was quoted as saying that “from now on there is no need for
discrimination between indigenous and foreign capital. We are living in an era where foreign
investment is more important than foreign trade” (Financial Times, 29 December 1997).government to commit itself to liberalize at some future date and hence to
confront incumbents with a credible deadline. One way of overcoming the
credibility problem is for governments to make binding commitments un-
der the GATS to provide market access at a precise future date.
In general, the use of the GATS as a mechanism for lending credibility to
future liberalization programs has been disappointing. The telecommuni-
cations sector is an exception, however. In this sector, several East Asian
governments are among those who have taken advantage of the GATS to
strike a balance between their reluctance to unleash competition immedi-
ately on protected national suppliers and their desire not to be held hostage
in perpetuity either to the weakness of domestic industry or to pressure
from vested interests (table 2.1). Singapore and Korea have bound them-
selves to introduce competition at precise future dates. Indonesia and Thai-
land are among the countries that have made weaker commitments.
Greater use needs to be made of the GATS in this respect, for there is grow-
ing evidence that reform programs that are believed are more likely to suc-
ceed.
2.3.2 Grandfather Provisions
A particularly perverse use of commitment from an economic point of
view is the inclusion of grandfather provisions in the ﬁnancial services
schedules of some countries under negotiating pressure. The issue arose be-
cause domestic law, pertaining to foreign ownership, branching, and other
rights, had changed since foreign ﬁrms ﬁrst established commercial pres-
ence. For instance, Malaysia began to implement its indigenization policy
after several fully foreign-owned ﬁrms were already operating in its market.
The home countries of the ﬁrms were unwilling to see a dilution of what
they saw as “acquired rights,” whereas Malaysia was unwilling to grant the
same rights to new entrants. The negotiated solution was for Malaysia to
commit to preserve the rights of incumbents while oﬀering inferior terms to
new investors (seetable 2.4). Where diﬀerences in ownership and legal form
aﬀect ﬁrm performance, new entrants have been placed at a competitive
disadvantage. Thus, the triumph of moral over economic reasoning has
meant that the GATS was used to make markets less contestable.
2.4 Regulatory Disciplines
Most of the key regulatory challenges must necessarily be addressed at
the national level, and, even more than in the case of other policies, there
are limits to what should and can be addressed at the multilateral level. Still,
there are likely to be beneﬁts from strengthened multilateral disciplines on
domestic regulations. First of all, such disciplines are needed to enable ex-
porters to address regulatory barriers to their exports in foreign markets.
For instance, unless disciplines are developed to deal with licensing and




Indonesia Banking and insurance: Share ownership of foreign services suppliers is bound
at the prevailing laws and regulations. The conditions of ownership and the
percentage share of ownership as stipulated in the respective shareholder
agreement establishing the existing individual joint venture shall be respected. No
transfer of ownership shall take place without the consent of all parties in the joint
venture concerned.
Malaysia Banking: Entry is limited to equity participation by foreign banks in Malaysian-
owned or controlled commercial and merchant banks with aggregate foreign
shareholding not to exceed 30 per cent, but the thirteen wholly-foreign owned
commercial banks are permitted to remain wholly-owned by their existing
shareholders.
Insurance: New entry is limited to equity participation by foreign insurance
companies in locally incorporated insurance companies with aggregate foreign
shareholding not to exceed 30%. Foreign shareholding not exceeding 51% is also
permitted when (i) existing branches of foreign insurance companies are locally
incorporated, which they are required to be by 30 June 1998, and (ii) for the
existing foreign shareholders of locally incorporated insurance companies which
were the original owners of these companies.
The Philippines Insurance and banking: New investments of up to 51% of the voting stock, but
existing investments of foreign banks will be maintained at their existing levels.
Legal Form-Related
Hong Kong Banking: The condition that branches of foreign banks are allowed to maintain
ofﬁces in one main building and no more than two additional ofﬁces in separate
buildings, does not apply to banks incorporated outside HKSAR licensed before
May 1978 in respect of fully licensed banks and before April 1990 in respect of
restricted licence banks.
Indonesia Banking: Existing branches of foreign banks are exempted from the requirement
imposed on new entrants to be in the form of locally incorporated joint venture
banks.
Malaysia Insurance: Branching is only permitted for direct insurance companies with
aggregate foreign shareholding of less than 50 per cent but companies are
permitted to maintain their existing network of branches. (See also foreign equity-
related provision above.)
Thailand Banking: While the establishment of new branches is subject to discretionary
licensing, existing foreign banks which already had the ﬁrst branch ofﬁce in
Thailand prior to July 1995 will each be permitted to open no more than two
additional branches.
General
The Philippines Insurance: Limitations in market access listed in the speciﬁc insurance sub-sectors
do not apply to existing wholly or majority foreign-owned authorized insurance/
reinsurance companies as of the entry into force of the WTO Financial Services
agreement.
Source: Compiled by the author from GATS Schedules of Commitments.qualiﬁcation requirements, market access commitments in areas like ﬁnan-
cial and professional services will have only notional value. Furthermore,
the development of such disciplines can play a signiﬁcant role in promoting
and consolidating domestic regulatory reform. The telecommunications
negotiations, which led to the early institution of independent regulators in
many countries, provide an example of this possibility. Finally, there is a
class of problems that must necessarily be addressed at the multilateral
level: the problem of international cartels in sectors like maritime transport.
2.4.1 The Case for a Horizontal Approach
One of the ironies of the GATS is that among its weakest general provi-
sions are those dealing with domestic regulations.9 The reason is not diﬃ-
cult to see: it is extremely diﬃcult to develop eﬀective multilateral disci-
plines in this area without seeming to encroach upon national sovereignty
and unduly limiting regulatory freedom. Nevertheless, it is desirable and
feasible to develop horizontal disciplines for domestic regulations (see also
Feketekuty 2000). Such a generic approach is to be preferred to a purely sec-
toral approach for at least three reasons: it economizes on negotiating
eﬀort, leads to the creation of disciplines for all services sectors rather than
only the politically important ones, and reduces the likelihood of negotia-
tions’ being captured by sectoral interest groups. It is now widely recog-
nized that the most dramatic progress in the European Union single-market
program came from willingness to take certain broad cross-sectoral initia-
tives. In the World Trade Organization (WTO) context, the experience of
the accountancy negotiations shows the propensity for single-sectoral ne-
gotiations on domestic regulations to produce a weak outcome: although a
valuable “necessity test” was instituted, the elaboration of disciplines on
measures such as qualiﬁcation requirements was disappointing.
Even if a horizontal approach is desirable, is it feasible? The diversity of
services sectors, and the diﬃculty in making certain policy-relevant gener-
alizations, would seem to favor a sector-speciﬁc approach. However, even
though services sectors diﬀer greatly, they have much in common in terms
of the underlying economic and social reasons for regulations. Focusing on
these reasons provides the basis for the creation of meaningful horizontal
disciplines. The economic case for regulation in all services sectors arises es-
sentially from market failure attributable primarily to three kinds of prob-
lems: natural monopoly or oligopoly, asymmetric information, and exter-
nalities (see table 2.5).
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9. The relevant provision (Article VI) requires members not to apply licensing and qualiﬁ-
cation requirements and technical standards so as to undermine market access commitments
in a manner that “could not reasonably have been expected” when the speciﬁc commitments
were made. This provision may provide a defense against new restrictions but could be inter-
preted to mean that old regulations whose persistence could reasonably have been expected
cannot be challenged.2.4.2 Dealing with Domestic Monopolies
Market failure due to natural monopoly or oligopoly may create trade
problems because incumbents can impede access to markets in the absence
of appropriate regulation. Because of its direct impact on trade, this is the
only form of market failure that may need to be addressed directly by multi-
lateral disciplines. The relevant GATS provision—Article VIII, dealing with
monopolies—is limited in scope. As a consequence, in the context of the
telecom negotiations, the reference paper with its competition principles was
developed in order to ensure that monopolistic suppliers would not under-
mine market access commitments (Tuthill 1997). It might be possible to gen-
eralize these principles to a variety of other network services, including
transport (terminals and infrastructure) and energy services (distribution
networks), by ensuring that any major supplier of essential facilities provides
access to all suppliers, national and foreign, at cost-based rates.10
2.4.3 Other Sources of Domestic Market Failure
In all other cases of market failure, multilateral disciplines do not need to
address the problem per se, but rather to ensure that domestic measures
to deal with the problem do not serve unduly to restrict trade. (The same
is true for measures designed to achieve social objectives.) Such trade-
restrictive eﬀects can arise from a variety of technical standards, prudential
regulations, and qualiﬁcation requirements in professional, ﬁnancial, and
numerous other services, as well as from the granting of monopoly rights to
complement universal service obligations in services like transport and
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10. Even though it would be extremely diﬃcult to determine what cost-based rates are, the
provision should at least make it possible to challenge the more egregious departures.
Table 2.5 A Multilateral Approach to Dealing with Domestic Regulations
Market Failures Services sectors Multilateral Approach
Monopoly/oligopoly Network services: transport (termi- Generalize key disciplines in tele-
nals and infrastructure), environ- com reference paper to ensure cost-
mental services (sewage) and energy  based access to essential facilities, be 
services (distribution networks) they roads, rail tracks, terminals, 
sewers or pipelines
Asymmetric  Intermediation and knowledge based  Nondiscrimination and generaliza-
information services: ﬁnancial services, profes- tion of the “necessity” test. Use the 
sional services, etc. test to create a presumption in favor 
of economically efﬁcient choice of 
policy in remedying market failure.
Externalities Transport, tourism, etc.
Social objectives
Universal service Transport, telecommunications, 
ﬁnancial, education, healthtelecommunications. The trade-inhibiting eﬀect of this entire class of regu-
lations is best disciplined by complementing the national treatment obliga-
tion with a generalization of the so-called “necessity” test. This test leaves
governments free to deal with economic and social problems provided that
any measures taken are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve
the relevant objective. The test is already applied to technical barriers to
trade in goods and is part of the recently established “pilot” disciplines for
the accountancy sector. It might make sense to go beyond the GATT prece-
dent and to use the test to create a presumption in favor of economically
eﬃcient choice of policy in remedying market failure and in pursuing
noneconomic objectives (Mattoo and Subramanian 1998). For instance, in
the case of professionals like doctors, a requirement to requalify would be
judged unnecessary, because the basic problem, inadequate information
about whether they possess the required skills, could be remedied by a less
burdensome test of competence.
The necessity test is generally seen as an additional discipline on nondis-
criminatory measures. It has not been recognized that without some such
test it would be diﬃcult to apply even the fundamental disciplines of na-
tional treatment (Article XVII) and MFN (Article II), for it would be im-
possible to determine if a measure is in eﬀect nondiscriminatory.11 Both
articles prohibit discrimination between like services and like service
suppliers, but likeness itself is not easy to establish. If a doctor is a doctor,
a regulation that imposed any additional burden on a doctor trained in
Country A (abroad) than on a doctor trained in Country B (at home) would
violate Article II (Article XVII). If a doctor trained in one country is
deemed not to be “like” a doctor trained in another country, then the disci-
plines contained in the articles would simply not apply. The former inter-
pretation may be unduly stringent and politically unsustainable; the latter
is unduly permissive and would open the door to all manner of regulatory
protection. The necessity test would seem to be the perfect solution. Coun-
tries are not prevented from imposing additional qualiﬁcation and training
requirements, but these should not be more burdensome than necessary, in
the sense described above.
To conclude, the arguments in this section must not be taken to mean that
there is no need for sector-speciﬁc work. Such work is necessary and should
involve consumers, industry, and regulators, to help determine how best to
deal with asymmetric information and diﬀerences in standards between
countries in particular sectors. However, the application of a necessity test
is necessary today because harmonization and mutual recognition are not
meaningful alternatives—even though they can play a role at the regional
or plurilateral level. The pessimism with regard to harmonization is based
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11. There is no explicit mention of the necessity test in the national treatment and MFN pro-
visions.on the absence of widely accepted international standards in services.
Where such standards exist, as in banking or maritime transport, meeting
them is seen as a ﬁrst step toward acceptability rather than as a suﬃcient
condition for market access. With regard to mutual recognition agreements
(MRAs), it would seem that even in strongly integrationist Europe, despite
a signiﬁcant level of prior harmonization, the eﬀect of MRAs may have
been limited by the unwillingness of host country regulators to concede
complete control (Nicolaidis and Trachtman 2000).
2.4.4 Competition Policy: The International Dimension
The procompetitive rules developed for the basic telecommunications
sector were designed to protect the rights of foreign suppliers. Is there a
need for broader competition policy disciplines in the GATS to protect the
interests of consumers more directly? Article IX of the GATS deals with
“certain business practices of service suppliers, other than those falling un-
der Article VIII, [that] may restrain competition and thereby restrict trade
in services.” However, its disciplines are weak and require little more than
consultation and information sharing.
There may be a need to strengthen these disciplines. Consider one partic-
ularly important example. Maritime transport costs have a profound inﬂu-
ence on international trade. Their persistent high level has been attributed
not only to restrictive trade policies but also to private anticompetitive prac-
tices such as rate-binding agreements, primarily but not exclusively of the
maritime conferences (Hummels 1999). The high incidence of such agree-
ments is due to the fact that the United States, the European Union, and
many other countries exempt shipping conferences from antitrust regulation
on the grounds that they provide price stability and limit uncertainty re-
garding available tonnage. In the case of routes serving the United States, the
exemption from antitrust law is compounded by the Federal Maritime Com-
mission’s (FMC) role in helping to police price-ﬁxing arrangements.12
A recent econometric analysis suggested that although public restric-
tions adversely aﬀect maritime transport costs, private anticompetitive prac-
tices have an even stronger impact.13 Thus, it would seem that even though
there has been an erosion in the power of conferences due to the entrance
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12. The 1984 U.S. Shipping Act required all ocean carriers to ﬁle their rates with the FMC
and publish their rate and schedule information. Secret discounting on ﬁled rates was until re-
cently considered illegal. The FMC was authorized to ensure, through the imposition of ﬁnes,
that the ﬁled rates were actually charged. The rationale for these measures was ostensibly to
protect small shippers from being disadvantaged by their inability to extract discounts from
shipping companies. Certain other aspects of U.S. maritime policy are discussed in section 2.5.
13. Fink, Mattoo, and Neagu (2000) estimate that the breakup of conference and other
price-setting agreements leads to a more dramatic reduction in transport prices (38 percent)
than restrictive cargo allocation policies (11 percent). The estimated potential savings from the
elimination of both could be as high as one billion U.S. dollars on goods carried to the United
States alone. Francois et al. (1996) and Francois and Wooton (1999) also ﬁnd signiﬁcant costs
of public and private restrictions on trade in maritime transport services.in the market of eﬃcient outsider shipping companies and of a certain
tightening in the law, collusive arrangements have not disappeared.14As re-
cently as May 2000, the European Commission imposed ﬁnes on shipping
lines serving the East Asian and U.S. routes and on those serving the trans-
atlantic route for collusive pricing that went beyond the scope of the ex-
emptions that had been granted.
What are the implications for policy? The negotiations on maritime trans-
port were the only post–Uruguay Round services negotiations that com-
pletely failed. This failure implied an unfortunate loss of political momen-
tum for reform of domestic policies and, less obviously, a lost opportunity
to develop procompetitive rules. To some extent, an eﬀort was made to de-
velop rules that would ensure nondiscriminatory access to port services.15
However, these rules, concerned primarily with ensuring market access, did
little to protect consumers from the anticompetitive practices of interna-
tional cartels. An international initiative is needed, because these practices
cannot be adequately addressed only through national competition policy,
given the weak enforcement capacity of small states. A further reason for
developing a ﬁrst best international response to these practices is to prevent
recourse to an inferior national response: recall that the costly cargo-
sharing schemes imposed by many developing countries were primarily a
reaction to the perceived power of conferences.
One approach would be to deal with the problem by creating sector-
speciﬁc competition rules, as has been attempted in basic telecommunica-
tions services under the GATS. However, if there is suﬃcient evidence that
anticompetitive practices also aﬀect other services sectors, such as air trans-
port and communications, there may a need to strengthen the general
GATS disciplines, that is, Article IX, dealing with anticompetitive business
practices.16 This would serve to reassure small countries in particular that
the gains from liberalization will not be eroded by collusive pricing.
2.5 The Most-Favored Nation Principle
The GATS and its MFN obligation came into eﬀect before WTO mem-
bers were willing to eliminate completely discriminatory measures in ser-
vices trade. The agreement therefore had to strike a diﬃcult balance between
creating meaningful multilateral disciplines and accommodating discrimi-
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14. A recent change in U.S. regulation regarding international shipping, notably the Ocean
Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998, allows for the conﬁdentiality of key terms (prices are
included in this category) in contracts between shippers and carriers but preserves the antitrust
immunity of the rate-setting conference system.
15. In some respects, the approach to port services, which can be seen as “essential facili-
ties” often controlled by “major” or monopoly suppliers, was analogous to the approach to
basic telecommunications networks established in the regulatory principles referred to above.
16. It is also conceivable that these issues could be addressed as part of broader competition
policy disciplines in the WTO.natory trade practices. The challenge to multilateral disciplines posed by the
explicit departures from the MFN obligation, such as the exceptions for re-
gional integration agreements and the MFN exemptions listed by members,
are widely recognized. However, the diﬃculties arising from less visible, im-
plicit discrimination have not been adequately appreciated.
2.5.1 The Scope and Signiﬁcance of Explicit Departures 
from Most-Favored Nation
Consider the explicit exemptions ﬁrst. Around 380 MFN exemptions have
been listed by some seventy members, with many members listing several ex-
emptions in the same sector (see Mattoo 2000b, table 1). Nearly two-thirds
of the exempted measures are to be found in communication services and in
transport services. One reason speciﬁed for these measures is the existence of
sector-speciﬁc preferential regional agreements, or other bilateral or pluri-
lateral agreements. For instance, in audiovisual services, more than half of
the exemptions mention promotion of common (regional) culture as a mo-
tive for limiting access to joint programs to ﬁnance and diﬀuse audiovisual
works; and in maritime transport, nearly half the exemptions are by devel-
oping countries for measures implementing the provisions of the United Na-
tions Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences.17 The other
reason cited for exemptions is a unilaterally imposed reciprocity condition,
which speciﬁes that a member is willing to guarantee access to its market
only to those members who provide it with access to their markets. These are
particularly signiﬁcant in air transport services and ﬁnancial services.18
In cases in which the exemptions coexist with speciﬁc commitments (as
in ﬁnancial services)19or legitimize preferences that do not greatly aﬀect the
pattern of trade (as in cross-border supply of land transport services), there
is probably not much cause for concern. Most-favored nation exemptions
would seem to matter most, and be most diﬃcult to eliminate, in sectors like
audiovisual services and maritime transport, where few speciﬁc commit-
ments have been made and discriminatory practices seem to be empirically
important.
Perhaps even more important than the MFN exemptions that have been
listed are those that did not need to be. The Annex on Air Transport specif-
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17. These provisions, in principle, divide 80 percent of the liner trade on a traﬃc route be-
tween the shipping companies of the two states at each end, leaving only 20 percent for ship-
ping companies of other nationalities. Full implementation of this rule is apparently rare, and
third-country ships usually have access to a larger share of the market. Many members chose
to maintain MFN exemptions despite the suspension of the obligation for the sector.
18. The exemptions listed for air transport services pertain to the services falling within the
scope of the GATS, that is, repair and maintenance, selling and marketing of air transport ser-
vices, and computer reservation system (CRS) services.
19. Market access guaranteed under speciﬁc commitments must be extended on a nondis-
criminatory basis to all trading partners, even if an MFN exemption has been sought. The
MFN exemption can provide legal cover only for better treatment for some trading partners
than provided for in the speciﬁc commitments.ically excludes the complex network of bilateral agreements on air traﬃc
rights from GATS rules.20 Thus, a sector that is in urgent need of liberaliza-
tion remains fragmented into cozy duopolies, and prospects for progress at
the multilateral level are dim. One source of hope is the increasing agree-
ment among WTO members to push for the liberalization of a cluster of ser-
vices related to tourism. Excluding air transport from this initiative would
be like leaving the Prince of Denmark out of a certain play.
The U.S. exemption in maritime transport was more like Banquo’s ghost:
it was not explicitly listed—because the MFN obligation was suspended for
the sector—but had a completely disruptive eﬀect on the negotiations.21
The United States did not believe that the quality of its trading partners’
market-opening commitments justiﬁed giving up its right to take retaliatory
action against foreign restrictive practices. One way of making progress in
the current round is to bundle transport negotiations together and focus on
the liberalization of multimodal transport, a central concern of U.S. indus-
try. Also, the development of competition disciplines, along the lines sug-
gested above, would help to address the anticompetitive practices that the
United States believes impede access to foreign markets.
The other main departure from MFN is the provision (Article V) for eco-
nomic integration agreements, which allows any subset of WTO members
to liberalize trade in services among themselves under certain conditions.
This provision is broadly modeled on the corresponding provision in the
GATT. The agreements that have been notiﬁed so far include those estab-
lishing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Euro-
pean Communities, and their member states; their agreements with the Slo-
vak Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Norway,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Bulgaria; and agreements between Canada and
Chile and between Australia and New Zealand.22
There is an important question of whether regional and other preferen-
tial agreements are capable of achieving deeper and more eﬀective liber-
alization of services, and whether they would contribute to or impede
further multilateral liberalization. A discussion of the role of these
agreements and the possible reform of the relevant GATS rules is beyond
the scope of this paper (see Stephenson 2000). The paper concentrates on
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20. International air transport services are for the most part governed by arrangements ne-
gotiated under the Chicago Convention (i.e., the International Air Services Transit Agree-
ment, done at Chicago, 7 December 1944).
21. The original U.S. MFN exemption for maritime transport services reserved the “right to
investigate and take action against foreign carriers to address adverse or unfavourable actions
aﬀecting United States shipping or United States carriers in United States oceanborne com-
merce and the cross trades between foreign ports.”
22. A related exception from the MFN rule, for the movement of natural persons, is per-
mitted by Article V bis of the GATS. This allows countries to take part in agreements that es-
tablish full integration of labor markets. The only such agreement notiﬁed so far is the one in-
volving Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.the narrower issue of the economic and legal implications of discrimina-
tion in services, where the instruments of protection are domestic regula-
tions and quotas.
2.5.2 Discrimination through Domestic Regulations and Quotas:
Economic Considerations 
The consequences of discrimination between trading partners through
taxation (or duties) are well understood. Does discrimination through do-
mestic regulations and quotas raise new analytical issues from the economic
and legal point of view?
When tariﬀs are the instruments of protection, the costs of trade diver-
sion for the importing country may be an important deterrent to preferen-
tial liberalization agreements. Despite the increase in consumers’ surplus
from any liberalization, governments may nevertheless be averse to such
agreements because the displacement of high-tariﬀ imports from third
countries by low or no-tariﬀ imports from preferential sources implies lost
revenue. The same reasoning also applies to other regulations that imply a
transfer from foreign suppliers to domestic interest groups. However, the
situation is diﬀerent when the protectionist instrument is a regulatory bar-
rier that imposes a cost on the exporter without yielding a corresponding
revenue for the importing government or other interest group. There is then
no cost to the country granting preferential access because there is no rev-
enue to lose. The same is true in the case of quotas when the rents were ei-
ther dissipated or appropriated by foreign suppliers. Therefore, in these
cases, preferential liberalization is necessarily welfare enhancing for the im-
porting country—as well as for the exporting country that obtains im-
proved access.23
However, if third countries supply the market in question, they lose be-
cause prices decline due to increased sales from the preferred source. The
impact on global welfare depends on the nature of regulatory measure. If it
generates no revenues or rents, then global welfare will increase. In eﬀect,
exempting some suppliers from the measure reduces their costs and leads to
a reduction in price in the importing country. The gain to consumers from
any decline in price is necessarily greater than the loss to a subset of suppli-
ers. This suggests that multilateral rules should take a more tolerant view of
preferential arrangements like recognition agreements that help eliminate
wasteful duplication (e.g., of training) and are therefore global welfare–
enhancing. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that nonpreferential
liberalization would enhance welfare even more because the service would
be supplied by the most eﬃcient locations.
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23. This reasoning does not take account of the fact that there may be greater spillover ben-
eﬁts (e.g., relating to technology) arising from trade with certain partners than with others.2.5.3 Legal considerations
Recognition Agreements
Recognition agreements are like sector-speciﬁc preferential arrange-
ments and can have similar trade-creating trade-diverting eﬀects. Their re-
sult may well be to create trade according to patterns of mutual trust rather
than the pattern of comparative advantage. The interpretation of the GATS
provision on recognition (Article VII) is, therefore, likely to be of consider-
able importance. The provision attempts to strike a diﬃcult balance. On the
one hand, it is permissive and allows a member at any point of time to rec-
ognize the standards of one or more members and not of others. On the
other hand, it seeks to ensure that this freedom is not abused by prohibiting
the use of recognition as a means of discrimination and requiring a member
who enters into a recognition agreement (RA) to aﬀord adequate opportu-
nity to other members to negotiate their accession to such an agreement
or to negotiate comparable ones. In this respect, Article VII mandates an
openness vis-à-vis third countries in a way that Article V, dealing with eco-
nomic integration agreements, does not.24
How can it be established whether acceptance of some standards and not
others is discriminatory? The approach discussed with regard to domestic
regulations is also applicable here. Making distinctions between services
and service suppliers in the pursuit of certain domestic policy objectives,
such as to ensure the quality of professional services, ﬁnancial stability, and
competitive market conditions, is economically sensible. It would, there-
fore, be desirable to allow members the legal freedom to pursue such objec-
tives but to discipline the exercise of such freedom by ensuring that the
choice and level of instruments is not more burdensome than necessary—
with economic eﬃciency considerations playing a role in this assessment.
The text of Article VII does not contain an explicit necessity test, but, as in
the case of the MFN and national treatment obligations, it is diﬃcult to see
how the provision can be given meaningful content without the inclusion of
such a test.
Nondiscriminatory Allocation of Quotas
One central legal issue in the GATS, which has received surprisingly little
attention, is how quotas are to be allocated in a manner consistent with the
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24. Article V on integration agreements does not explicitly preclude RAs, and several coun-
tries (such as Australia and New Zealand) have chosen to notify their RAs under this provi-
sion. It would seem desirable to establish that Article VII, with its desirable nondiscriminatory
and open-ended nature, overrides Article V of the GATS as far as RAs are concerned. This in-
terpretation would help to generalize the liberalizing impact of RAs, for although an RA
amounts to an acceptance of likeness vis-à-vis suppliers from a particular country, it also de-
ﬁnes the appropriate standard of treatment vis-à-vis suppliers from other countries.nondiscrimination obligation. In the past, this was not a major issue be-
cause commitments reﬂected the status quo, and the quotas, particularly
with regard to service suppliers, were descriptions of the existing market
structure.25In the future, however, as genuine liberalizing commitments are
made, the nondiscriminatory allocation of quotas is bound to be an impor-
tant issue. For instance, it has been reported that China, as part of its ac-
cession negotiations, promised the European Union that its ﬁrms would be
granted a speciﬁc number of licenses in the insurance sector. How is this as-
surance to be reconciled with the MFN obligation?
The goods precedent oﬀers limited guidance. General Agreement on
Tariﬀs and Trade Article XIII, on the “nondiscriminatory administration
of quantitative restrictions,” requires aiming at a distribution of trade ap-
proximating the shares that countries might be expected to have in the ab-
sence of such restrictions or supplied during a previous representative pe-
riod. In the services context, the requirement to replicate historical shares
may have no relevance if there was no previous foreign presence, or it may
perpetuate historical discrimination if previous quotas were allocated to fa-
vored suppliers.26
More appropriate candidates for a nondiscriminatory allocation of quotas
would seem to be ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served rule (e.g., a large number of work
permits are being issued) or a system of auctions to the highest bidder (e.g., a
few telecom licenses are being issued). Neither rule would necessary lead to
distributions that “might be expected to obtain in the absence of such re-
strictions.”27It would seem, therefore, that the rules for ensuring nondiscrim-
inatory allocation of quotas under GATS would need to look beyond the
GATT precedent. It is possible that a less elaborate variant of the disciplines
in the Agreement on Government Procurement, designed to ensure compet-
itive tendering on a nondiscriminatory basis, will need to be considered.
2.6 Reviving Reciprocity?
Reciprocity has been a central principle governing GATT/WTO negoti-
ations: one country reduces its level of protection in return for a reciprocal
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25. Thus, when Bangladesh committed to “four licenses issued” in cellular telephony, the
ambiguity in the choice of tense was not an accident: the licenses in question had already been
issued.
26. In the Bananas Case, the European Union’s method of allocating import licenses for ba-
nanas from certain sources was found to be inconsistent with Article II because it reallocated
quotas and quota rents away from the importers who traditionally imported from these
sources (see paragraphs 7.350–7.353 of the Panel Report). In a sense, the panel’s reasoning fol-
lowed the logic of GATT Article XIII.
27. It is obvious that ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served favors the proximate. Auctions would give the
relatively eﬃcient producers larger shares than they would have obtained in the absence of
quotas (when quotas are set at below unrestricted trade levels). Jackson (1997, p. 140), how-
ever, notes that ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served and auctions would seem to fulﬁll the MFN obligation,
and refers to the Article XIII reliance on historical patterns as a “quasi” MFN principle.reduction by its trading partner.28 While reciprocity-based negotiations are
widely credited with the substantial reduction in levels of protection
achieved in goods trade, it is surprising that the limited application of the
principle has not conversely been seen as the reason for the disappointing
results in services trade.
The GATS had a deliberately symmetric structure. In principle, there was
scope for developed and developing countries to exploit their modal com-
parative advantage: improved access for capital from developed countries
being exchanged for improved temporary access for individual service pro-
viders from developing countries. In practice, there was little political will
to improve access for foreign individuals (except for the limited class of
skilled intracorporate transferees), and a trade-oﬀ between modes of deliv-
ery simply did not take place. Moreover, even the negotiating links across
services sectors and between services and goods sectors do not seem to have
been particularly fruitful. Thus, the GATS commitments reﬂect for the
most part the existing levels of unilaterally determined policy rather than
liberalization achieved through a reciprocal exchange of “concessions.”
It might well be that reciprocity cannot and will not play a major role in
services trade. Services liberalization could for the most part be undertaken
unilaterally, and the GATS would be important only in preventing its re-
versal—that is, in its credibility role (see Hoekman and Messerlin 2000). In-
deed, for countries that are either determined to liberalize or determined to
protect, negotiations are not important. However, for countries in the
middle ground, who are open to reform but whose ability to implement re-
form is constrained by domestic opposition, multilateral negotiations can
be useful. Many developing countries are today in this situation, and a
wider application of the principle of reciprocity may deliver greater liberal-
ization and more balanced outcomes.
2.6.1 Facilitating Reciprocity across Modes
A collective commitment to the use of appropriately designed formulas
oﬀers the best chance of linking diﬀerent modes of delivery.29 Such formu-
las can also help overcome concerns about free-riding that arise in an
MFN-based system. But is it technically feasible to link concessions across
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28. This emphasis on achieving a “balance of (liberalizing) concessions” has led to the per-
ception of WTO negotiations as a mercantilist process driven by political forces that never-
theless leads to the desirable outcome of reduced levels of protection. In eﬀect, reciprocity
serves to mobilize the support of export interests to counterbalance the protectionist interests
of import-competing ﬁrms and workers. In an important recent paper, Bagwell and Staiger
(1999) show that reciprocity can be seen as neutralizing the adverse terms of trade eﬀects as-
sociated with unilateral reductions in protection, and it therefore leads to greater liberaliza-
tion.
29. Developing countries have resisted this option, preferring the use of a request-and-oﬀer
approach. Their reluctance stems from defensive considerations and a belief that they would
be obliged to concede excessively high levels of openness if a formula approach were adopted.modes (see Sapir 1998 and Thompson 2000)? One simple option is to take
advantage of the current political pressure for accelerated liberalization in
selected sectors, such as environmental services. This approach could be ac-
cepted on the condition that there was no gerrymandering: that is, all coun-
tries would liberalize access in all modes, including the movement of indi-
viduals. Environmentalists and environmental service exporters could then
be relied on to counter the opposition of employees and individual suppli-
ers in the domestic environmental industry. Furthermore, with severe short-
ages of skilled labor in the United States and Europe and the powerful con-
stituency of high-technology companies lobbying for relaxation of visa
limits, the prospects for serious intermodal trade-oﬀs—such as obtaining
labor movement in return for allowing greater commercial presence for for-
eign service providers—are now greater.
An alternative way of creating a link between modes is by requiring each
country to provide increased “foreign labor content entitlements” to its do-
mestic ﬁrms in relation to the country’s increased exports of services (Mat-
too and Olarreaga 2000a). Entitlements would be global rather than bi-
lateral, and the extent and pattern of use would be determined by sound
economic considerations of modal comparative advantage. Some of the so-
cial and political diﬃculties could be overcome by clarifying that liberal-
ization is only with respect to temporary movement of service suppliers and
does not imply migration. Establishing clear links between increased ex-
ports and increased foreign labor content entitlements may also help make
the political case. The presence of foreign workers would be seen as a direct
consequence of increased opportunities for export abroad, and also as con-
tributing to the increased competitiveness that makes it possible to exploit
these opportunities.
2.6.2 Reciprocity within Modes across Sectors
It would be wrong to suggest that reciprocity must necessarily take an in-
termodal form. There may, for instance, be scope for cross-sectoral reci-
procity in the same mode. Trade in electronically delivered products—
falling within the scope of cross-border supply—is of growing importance
and oﬀers an increasingly viable alternative to the movement of individuals.
If the United States can supply ﬁnancial and audiovisual services to the
Philippines electronically, the Philippines in turn can supply software de-
velopment and data processing services to the United States. Fortunately,
most electronic commerce is already free of barriers, and so the main con-
cern should be preventing the introduction of new barriers if they ever be-
come technically feasible. Members of the WTO have so far focused on
prohibiting the imposition of customs duties on electronically delivered
products. Because the bulk of such commerce concerns services, open trad-
ing conditions are more eﬀectively secured through deeper and wider com-
mitments under the GATS on cross-border trade regarding market access
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(which would preclude all forms of discriminatory taxation).30One possible
formula would be for all members to agree that no restrictions would be im-
posed on cross-border delivery, either of all services or of a bundle whose
composition could be negotiated.
2.6.3 Remedying the Hold-Back Problem through a Credit Rule
One undesirable aspect of an emphasis on reciprocity is that it creates the
temptation to hold back from unilateral liberalization. This is why most
economists view reciprocity with suspicion. This hold-back problem can be
overcome, however, by rules which create an ex ante assurance (at the end
of a round of negotiations) that credit would be given in future rounds of
negotiations for unilateral liberalization undertaken between rounds. The
impulse to liberalize unilaterally then need not be inhibited by the fear of
loss of negotiating coinage. The proposed rule is diﬀerent from the demands
for credit that are typically made at the beginning of a new round of negoti-
ations. The acceptance of such demands would have only a distributional
eﬀect, favoring those who have already undertaken liberalization, and the
granting of such credit relies on the unlikely generosity of those who have
not liberalized. The proposed ex ante assurance of credit rule has three
virtues:31 it would help induce or enhance liberalization in some countries
between negotiating rounds; more striking, it could also lead to deeper lev-
els of multilateral liberalization and force other countries to go further than
in the absence of a rule; and, most important, such a rule does not rely on
altruism to be generally acceptable.
Article XIX:3 of the GATS requires that in each future round “modali-
ties shall be established” for the treatment of liberalization undertaken au-
tonomously by members since previous negotiations. In principle, this is
precisely the type of ex ante assurance of credit that would be desirable.
However, the nebulousness of the provision and the postponement of the
establishment of modalities suggest that in practice the provision may pro-
vide little more than a basis for ex post demands for credit. One way of giv-
ing the rule operational content is by establishing that any agreed liberaliz-
ing formula would be applied not to current actual levels of protection but
to the levels bound in the previous round of negotiations.32
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30. There is considerable scope for an improvement in commitments. For instance, in soft-
ware implementation and data processing, of the total WTO membership of over 130, only 56
and 54 members, respectively, have made commitments; only around half of these commitments
guarantee unrestricted market access, and a similar proportion guarantees unqualiﬁed national
treatment. It is particularly striking that in the core banking services in which around 75 WTO
members have made commitments, about one-third of the developing countries guarantee un-
restricted cross-border supply, whereas only one out of the ten developed countries does so.
31. The alternative rules are discussed more fully in Mattoo and Olarreaga (2000b).
32. This suggestion was in fact contained in a proposal from Brazil submitted just before the
Seattle Ministerial.2.7 Conclusions
“Reveal and bind all trade-restricting measures.” “Make national treat-
ment a general obligation.” It would be tempting to make such clear and
powerful proposals, but it would not be realistic or useful. The GATS is here
to stay in its present form, and radical reform will not occur in this round of
negotiations—nor, probably, in the next. Those who think that this is unduly
conservative need only take a closer look at the negotiations in the Working
Party on GATS rules. The results of ﬁve years’ work on subjects such as safe-
guards, subsidies, and government procurement are no more tangible than
the emperor’s new clothes. In defense of the GATS, however, it must be rec-
ognized that it took about a half century to reduce goods barriers, and there
is still a distance to go. Additionally, of course, agriculture was exempted
from the GATT negotiations until the Uruguay Round and continues to
pose special problems. Thus, a fairly long time horizon is probably needed to
achieve meaningful liberalization in services because of the diﬃculty in over-
coming resistance by deep-rooted vested interest in many countries.
It seemed more constructive, therefore, to take a close look at the existing
provisions of the agreement and make precise proposals on how they can be
improved. The main conclusions are the following:
• Wasteful regulations and entry restrictions pervade services trade. Un-
like the GATT, the GATS has created no hierarchy of instruments of
protection, although the analysis here suggests that the ranking of in-
struments in the case of both goods and services is similar. Although it
may not yet be politically feasible to impose the same hierarchy as in
goods, an attempt should nevertheless be made to create a legal pre-
sumption in favor of instruments (such as ﬁscal measures) that provide
protection more eﬃciently.
• Greater advantage must be taken of the valuable opportunity oﬀered
by the GATS to lend credibility to reform programs by committing to
maintain current levels of openness or by precommitting to greater lev-
els of future openness.
• Multilateral rules on domestic regulations can play an important role
in promoting and consolidating domestic regulatory reform, even
when they are primarily designed to prevent the erosion of market ac-
cess commitments. It would be desirable to generalize the application
of procompetitive principles developed for basic telecommunications
to other network-based services sectors and the application of the “ne-
cessity test” instituted for accountancy services to regulatory instru-
ments in all sectors.
• Anticompetitive practices could be important in sectors like maritime,
air transport, and communication services. Because these practices
74 Aaditya Mattoocannot be adequately addressed through national competition policy,
given the weak enforcement capacity of small states, GATS rules in this
area must be strengthened.
• Explicit departures from the MFN rule matter most in sectors like
maritime transport, audiovisual services, and air transport services—
which have been excluded from GATS disciplines. Progress will not be
easy, but bundling sectoral negotiations together (e.g., in transport)
may help. It is also necessary to develop rules to ensure the nondis-
criminatory allocation of quotas and to maintain the desirable open-
ness of the GATS provision covering mutual recognition agreements.
• If the GATS is to advance the process of services liberalization beyond
levels undertaken independently and lead to more balanced outcomes
from the developing country point of view, then reciprocity must play
a greater role in negotiations. This may be facilitated by devising nego-
tiating formulas that establish credible links across sectors (both goods
and services) and across modes of delivery. To overcome a possible
hold-back problem, it is necessary to provide credible ex ante assur-
ance of negotiating credit for unilateral liberalization.
Finally, three sets of issues have been neglected by this paper: How can
the provisions of the GATS and the schedules of commitments be made
clearer and more accessible? What rules should be developed for safe-
guards, subsidies, and government procurement? What form do preferen-
tial agreements in services take, and how can GATS rules for such agree-
ments be improved? Some work has been done in each of these areas, but
there is need for much more research (see Sauvé and Stern 2000).
References
Adlung, Rudolf. 2000. Services trade liberalization from developed and developing
country perspectives. In GATS 2000: New directions in services trade liberaliza-
tion, ed. Pierre Sauvé and Robert M. Stern, 112–31. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution.
Deardoﬀ, Alan. 1994. Market access. In New world trading system: Readings, 57–63.
Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
———. 2000. Tariﬃcation in services. Paper presented at Conference on Issues and
Options for Multilateral, Regional, and Bilateral Policies of the United States and
Japan. Universisty of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 5–6 Novermber. Available at
[http://www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/conferences.html].
Feketekuty, Geza. 2000. Assessing and improving the architecture of GATS. In
GATS 2000: New directions in services trade liberalization, Pierre Sauvé and
Robert M. Stern, 85–111. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Fink, Carsten, Aadity Mattoo, and Cristina Neagu. 2000. Trade in international
Shaping Future Rules for Trade in Services 75maritime services: How much does policy matter? Washington, D.C.: World
Bank. Mimeograph.
Francois, Joseph, Hugh Arce, Kenneth Reinert, and Joseph Flynn. 1996. Commer-
cial policy and the domestic carrying trade: A general equilibrium assessment of
the Jones Act. Canadian Journal of Economics 29 (1): 181–98.
Francois, Joseph, and Ian Wooton. 1999. Trade in international transport service:
The role of competition. Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper
no. 2377. London: Center for Economic Policy Research.
Hindley, Brian. 1988. Service sector protection: Consideration for developing coun-
tries. World Bank Economic Review 2:205–24.
Hindley, Brian, and Alasdair Smith. 1984. Comparative advantage and trade in ser-
vices. World Economy 7:369–90.
Hoekman, Bernard. 1996. Assessing the general agreement on trade in services. In
The Uruguay Round and the developing countries, ed. W. Martin and L. A. Win-
ters, 88–124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hoekman, Bernard M., and Patrick A. Messerlin. 2000. Liberalizing trade in ser-
vices: Reciprocal negotiations and regulatory reform. In GATS 2000: New direc-
tions in services trade liberalization, ed. Pierre Suavé and Robert M. Stern, 487–
508. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Hummels, David. 1999. Have international transportation costs declined? Univer-
sity of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, Manuscript.
Jackson, J. H. The world trading system: Law and policy of international economic re-
lations. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Laﬀont, Jean Jacques. 1998. Competition, information, and development. Paper
presented at Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics. April 20–21,
Washington, D.C.
Mattoo, Aaditya. 2000a. Developing countries and the new round of GATS negoti-
ations: Towards a pro-active role. World Economy 23:471–89.
———. 2000b. MFN and the GATS. In Most-favored nation treatment: Past and
present, ed. Thomas Cottier and Petros Mavroidis, 51–99. Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Michigan University Press.
Mattoo, Aaditya, and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2000a. Reciprocity across modes of
supply: A negotiating formula. World Bank Policy Research Paper, forthcoming.
———. 2000b. Should credit be given for unilateral liberalization in multilateral ne-
gotiations? World Bank Policy Research Paper, forthcoming.
Mattoo, Aaditya, and Arvind Subramanian. 1998. Regulatory autonomy and mul-
tilateral disciplines. Journal of International Economic Law 1:303–22.
Nicolaidis, Kalypso, and Joel P. Trachtman. 2000. From policed regulation to man-
aged recognition: Mapping the boundary in GATS. In GATS 2000: New direc-
tions in services trade liberalization, ed. Pierre Suavé and Robert. M. Stern, 241–
82. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Sapir, A. 1998. GATS 1994–2000. Journal of World Trade 33:51–66.
Suavé, Pierre, and Robert M. Stern, eds. 2000. GATS 2000: New directions in services
trade liberalization. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Snape, Richard. 1994. Services and the Uruguay Round. In The new world trading sys-
tem: Readings. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Stephenson, Sherry. 2000. GATS and regional integration. In GATS 2000: New di-
rections in services trade liberalization, eds. Pierre Suavé and Robert M. Stern,
509–42.
Thompson, Rachel. 2000. Formula approaches to improving GATS commitments.
In GATS 2000: New directions in services trade liberalization, ed. Pierre Suavé and
Robert M. Stern, 473–86.
76 Aaditya MattooTuthill, Lee. 1997. The GATS and new rules for regulators. Telecommunications Pol-
icy, 23 (November): 783–98.
UNCTAD and World Bank. 1994. Liberalizing international transactions in ser-
vices: A handbook. New York: United Nations.
Comment Anne O. Krueger
This is an excellent paper and well worth careful reading. It addresses the
issues and challenges that confront successful multilateral negotiations to
liberalization of trade in services, yet neither gives way to despair nor insists
upon politically infeasible solutions (such as national treatment with no
barriers to foreign services or services providers).
Eﬀorts to liberalize trade in services are increasingly important as ser-
vices trade increases even more rapidly than trade in goods, paralleling the
increasing share of modern services in the economies of the industrialized
countries. However, the diﬃculties of negotiating liberalization are formi-
dable: whereas barriers to trade in goods were traditionally border mea-
sures (tariﬀs, quotas, etc.) that were reasonably comparable across goods
(one could always estimate the tariﬀequivalent of quotas and surcharges on
imports), trade in services is restricted through a variety of measures—li-
censing of ﬁnancial intermediaries, imposition of quality and standards
regulation of services providers, regulations governing foreign direct in-
vestment in service sectors in which domestic presence is essential to trade,
and restrictions on access (as with airplane landing rights and control over
port access).
As Mattoo points out, there is good reason to believe that a global mul-
tilateral deal could be struck between capital-exporting industrialized
countries who want access to developing country markets for their capital-
intensive services and labor-abundant developing countries, who could
proﬁtably export unskilled labor–intensive services if temporary entry were
granted to foreign workers for work on such services as construction.
A key issue, as Mattoo recognizes, is how much can be achieved by cross-
sectoral negotiations. Some observers, noting the diﬀerent types of barriers
to entry in diﬀerent service sectors, have concluded that sector-speciﬁc ne-
gotiation (such as happened in telecoms) is the only way forward. However,
the diﬃculties with this are well known and deserve repetition here. The ge-
nius of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade and the World Trade
Organization has been in achieving cross-sectoral tying in such a way that
countries were willing to give up protection of some items in return for re-
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a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.duced trade barriers (tariﬀs) in other sectors. Clearly, there are some activ-
ities in which liberalization is desirable, with or without a quid pro quo, that
will take place unilaterally. In other cases, protection has such strong polit-
ical backing that it will not be removed even with multilateral bargaining.
In between, however, lie a host of protectionist measures that would or
could be reduced given suﬃcient incentives (in the form of reciprocal re-
duction of other services barriers to the country’s exports). Most of these
in-between cases—which is what the multilateral tariﬀnegotiations enabled
for trade in goods—can be traded oﬀ only against reduced protection in
other sectors.
Hence the need for cross-sectoral negotiations. Some things, Mattoo
notes, can be done. Finding a least-cost way to achieve domestic objectives
and showing the necessity of a barrier can help. However, Mattoo seems to
despair of ﬁnding any uniform metric to enable formula-based negotiations
(such as was ﬁnally possible in agriculture with the development of the pro-
ducer-subsidy-equivalent measure). This, it seems to me, is too pessimistic.
To be sure, we do not have such a metric yet, but the tariﬀ equivalent of ex-
isting protection on maritime services, barriers to entry of insurance or le-
gal ﬁrms, and others may be estimable. Surely, as economists, we should
keep trying to ﬁnd acceptable ways of quantifying these barriers.
Finally, I wonder whether things are quite as bleak for services as Mattoo
paints them. We do have the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and
some barriers are listed and therefore bound. Perhaps in a next round coun-
tries could agree to list all remaining service barriers and to bind them to
those (or even lower) levels. Further, there might be an agreement to eschew
imposing barriers on new services. Perhaps we could even begin to develop
a regime for some temporary movement of workers to provide services in
exchange for removal or relaxation of ceilings on the percentage ownership
of foreigners in some or all service industries.
That said, there are a great many constructive suggestions in Mattoo’s
paper. Let us hope that they, at least, can inﬂuence the next round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations.
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